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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - RIGHT TO
TREATMENT - INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED MENTAL PATIENTS -
The United States Supreme Court has held that an involuntarily
committed mental patient has constitutionally protected liberty in-
terests in personal safety, freedom of movement, and such mini-
mally adequate treatment as might be required by these liberty
interests.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
In 1974, Nicholas Romeo, a thirty-three year old profoundly re-
tarded man, was involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, Spring City, Pennsylvania, by the Philadel-
phia County Court of Common Pleas, at the request of his
mother.' Romeo could not speak and lacked rudimentary self-care
skills.2 While at Pennhurst, he suffered several injuries that were
caused by his own violence, as well as by the reactions of other
patients to him.' Romeo's mother became concerned about the in-
juries and, after objecting several times to his treatment, filed suit
on November 4, 1976, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as Romeo's next friend, pursuant
1. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2454-55 (1982). Nicholas Romeo had the
mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child with an IQ ranging between eight and ten.
In 1974, Romeo's mother petitioned the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to
admit him to a state hospital on a permanent basis, as she was unable to control his violent
behavior following his father's death. The Court of Common Pleas, upon the recommenda-
tion of a psychologist and physician, committed Romeo pursuant to the involuntary com-
mitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act. Id. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (Purdon 1969) which provides in pertinent part-
(a) Whenever a person is believed to be mentally disabled, and in need of care or
treatment by reason of such Mental disability, and examination of such person has
been made by a physician or physicians, or for any reason the examination of such
person cannot be made, a petition may be presented to the court of common pleas of
the county in which a person resides or is, for his immediate examination or commit-
ment to an appropriate facility for examination, observation and diagnosis.
Id.
2. 102 S. Ct. at 2455.
3. Id.
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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
The mother's complaint originally sought damages and injunc-
tive relief from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors, specifi-
cally alleging that her son had been injured on numerous occa-
sions.5 The complaint further asserted that the Pennhurst officials
knew or should have known about the injuries Romeo received and
that they did not initiate adequate measures to prevent such inju-
ries, resulting in a violation of Romeo's constitutional rights under
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.6 After the complaint was
filed, Romeo suffered a broken arm and was confined to the insti-
tution's hospital where he was physically restrained to prevent in-
jury to himself and other patients.7
In 1977, an amended complaint was filed which dropped all
claims for injunctive relief,8 but added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for defendants' failure to provide him with ade-
quate treatment for his mental condition.9 The amended complaint
further alleged that defendants were deliberately restraining Ro-
meo for extended periods of time on a regular basis.10
In April, 1978, a trial was held in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in which the peti-
tioners introduced evidence that Romeo participated in several ba-
sic health care programs." Romeo introduced evidence of the inju-
4. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper Oroceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
5. 102 S. Ct. at 2455. Paula Romeo sued Duane Youngberg, Superintendent of
Pennhurst; Richard Matthews, Director of Resident Life; and Marquerite Conley, Unit Di-
rector for Nicholas Romeo. Id. n.3.
6. Id. at 2455.
7. Id. The restraints were ordered by Dr. Gabroy allegedly to protect Romeo and the
other patients in the hospital. After his arm healed, Romeo was kept in the infirmary be-
cause of his pending lawsuit. Id.
8. Id. at 2455-56. Claims for injunctive relief were dropped because Romeo was a
member of a class seeking such relief in another action. See Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (remanded for further proceedings) (patients at
Pennhurst brought a separate class action seeking injunctive relief against the institution).
9. 102 S. Ct. at 2455.
10. Id. The restraints generally consisted of soft shackles for the arms. Id. n.4.
11. Id. at 2456. Prior to Romeo's transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, he partici-
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ries he sustained and of the conditions in his section of the
hospital.12 The jury was instructed that if the Pennhurst officials
knew about Romeo's injuries and neglected to take reasonable
steps to prevent them, this failure caused Romeo the loss of his
constitutional rights. 3  Additionally, the jury was further in-
structed that only if defendant officials were "deliberately indiffer-
ent"14 to the medical needs of Romeo, could they find that Ro-
meo's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments were
violated.'8 The jury rendered judgment for the defendants."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 7 reversed
and remanded the case, stating that the eighth amendment was
not the proper source for determining the rights of the involunta-
rily committed mental patient. 8 In applying the fourteenth
amendment, the court held that mental patients who have been
involuntarily committed retain their liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security that can be limited only by an
"overriding, non-punitive state interest."119 The Court of Appeals
further concluded that the involuntarily committed have a liberty
interest in treatment designed to aid their condition.2
The court of appeals did not agree upon the appropriate stan-
dard to be applied in determining whether Romeo's rights had in-
deed been violated." It concluded that physical restraint raised a
pated in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control and toilet
training, as well as a program providing interaction with staff members. It was indicated
that some programs continued while Romeo was in the hospital, which reduced his aggres-
sive behavior to some extent. Id. n.7.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2456. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 110. The jury was further
instructed that if defendants restrained Romeo as punishment for initiating the law suit, his
constitutional rights under the eighth amendment had been violated. 102 S. Ct. at 2456. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 73-74.
14. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prisoners' right to punishment which is
not cruel and unusual). The Court found that the district court improperly applied the de-
liberate indifference standard. 102 S. Ct. at 2456 n.11.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2456. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. at 111-12.
16. 102 S. Ct. at 2456.
17. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the case en banc. See 644
F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2456. The court stated that it was the fourteenth amendment liberty
interest which gave rise to the rights sought in the case at hand and not the eighth amend-
ment. See 644 F.2d at 156.
19. 102 S. Ct. at 2456. The court stated that the liberty interests of freedom and per-
sonal security were fundamental liberties. See 644 F.2d at 157-58.
20. 102 S. Ct. at 2456. The court of appeals used the terms habilitation and treatment
synonymously. See 644 F.2d at 165 n.40.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2457.
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presumption of punishment and could be justified only upon a
showing of "compelling necessity."' 2 The court chose to employ the
different standard of "substantial necessity" in deciding whether
the defendants had failed to provide for Romeo's personal safety.2
Finally, the court held that when treatment is administered, the
official will be held liable.only if the treatment is not acceptable in
conjunction with modern or current medical knowledge.24 Chief
Judge Seitz, in a concurring opinion, stated that the Constitution
merely requires the actual exercise of professional judgment and
considered the standards proposed by the majority as indistin-
guishable from those applicable to medical malpractice cases.15 He
proposed that the proper standard to apply was whether defen-
dants' conduct was such a substantial departure from accepted
standards in the care and treatment of mental patients as to illus-
trate that the defendants did not base their actions on professional
judgment."6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 7 to con-
sider the substantive rights of the involuntarily committed in light
of the fourteenth amendment.' Speaking for the majority,'" Jus-
tice Powell recognized three separate claims for consideration: the
liberty interest in safety,30 the interest in freedom of movement, 1
and the involuntarily committed person's interest in habilitation or
training.3 ' The Court first acknowledged that solely because Ro-
22. Id. See 644 F.2d at 159-60.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 2457.
24. Id. See 644 F.2d at 166-67, 173. The court divided the right to treatment claim
into three categories but only one was discussed in the text of the opinion. The court of
appeals also held that if the jury found that no treatment had been administered, it could
hold the institution's administrators liable unless they could provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment. 102 S. Ct. at 2457 n.14. See also 644 F.2d at 165, 173.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 2457. See 644 F.2d at 178 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
26. Id.
27. 451 U.S. 982 (1981). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the issue
presented was important to the administration of state institutions for the mentally re-
tarded. 102 S. Ct. at 2457.
28. Id. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Romeo no longer relied upon the eighth amendment claim. 102 S.
Ct. at 2457 n.16. See also Brief for Respondent at 13 n.12, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct.
2452 (1982).
29. Justice Powell filed the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring
opinion in which Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined. Chief Justice Burger filed a sepa-
rate concurring opinion. 102 S. Ct. at 2453.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 2457.
31. Id. at 2458.
32. Id. at 2457-58. Romeo did not challenge his commitment under Pennsylvania law.
1040 Vol. 21:1037
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meo had been committed to Pennhurst, he did not relinquish all
his substantive rights under the fourteenth amendment.33 Justice
Powell noted that the state conceded that it had a duty to provide
Romeo with food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, but that the
issue confronting the Court concerned his interests in personal
safety, freedom of movement, and a right to treatment. "
The first two claims, the interest in safety and freedom of move-
ment, stated Justice Powell, involve liberty interests already recog-
nized by the Court." The Court stated that if it is cruel and un-
usual punishment to hold criminals in unsafe facilities, it must be
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed mental pa-
tient in unsafe conditions. 6 The Court also recognized respon-
dent's right to freedom from bodily restraint by concluding that
since such a right survives criminal conviction, it must also survive
committal to a state mental institution. 7 However, the third claim,
the constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation is much
less defined by previous case law. 8 Justice Powell recognized that
Romeo was asserting a substantive due process claim under the
fourteenth amendment and he suggested that such a right to mini-
mal treatment should be determined on a case-by-case basis in
light of present medical knowledge.8
Id. at 2457.
33. Id. at 2458. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94 (1980) (action challenging the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute allowing a Director of Correctional Services to trans-
fer a prisoner to a mental hospital if a designated physician or psychologist finds the pris-
oner suffering from a mental disease).
34. 102 S. Ct. at 2458. If such interests did exist, the Court was further called upon to
determine if these rights had been violated. Id.
35. Id. The claim for a personal security right constitutes an historic liberty interest
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and is not suspended by
confinement. Id. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (school children have a liberty
interest in personal safety-historically established liberty interest in personal safety). Sec-
ondly, the claim for right to freedom from bodily restraint has always been recognized as the
core of the liberty interest protected by the due process clause. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (prisoners have a right to free-
dom from bodily confinement). The Supreme Court noted that this interest survives invol-
untary commitment. 102 S. Ct. at 2458.
36. 102 S. Ct. at 2458. See Hutto v. Finey, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (Supreme Court held it
was cruel and unusual to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions). See also supra note
35 and accompanying text.
37. 102 S. Ct. at 2458. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38. 102 S. Ct. at 2458. Justice Powell noted that the remaining claim was more troub-
ling. Id.
39. Id. at 2458-59. Romeo argued that he was committed for care and treatment under
state law, and therefore had a substantive right to treatment. Id. at 2458 n.19. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text for definition of treatment.
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The Court began its analysis with the established principle that
the state is under no constitutional duty to provide substantial ser-
vices for those within its confines.4 The Court conceded however,
that when a person is institutionalized, the state does have a duty
to provide certain services and care within its discretion.4 ' Justice
Powell noted that Romeo was not proposing that any amount of
treatment would make his release possible.42 Furthermore, it was
noted that Romeo was not alleging that if he had remained at
home, the state would have had a duty to provide him with treat-
ment.4 The Court concluded that on the basis of the record, re-
spondent sought only "habilitation" or training directly related to
his liberty interest in safety and freedom of movement.44 The
Court specifically noted that this case did not present the difficult
question of whether an involuntarily committed mental patient has
some general constitutional right to treatment, even when such
treatment would not lead to a release.
4 5
The majority proposed that Romeo had adopted the position
proposed by Chief Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion below,
that Romeo had a constitutional right to minimally adequate care
and treatment, 46 noting that Chief Judge Seitz did not expand
upon this right to treatment beyond the ideas of personal safety
and freedom of movement.47 Thus the majority did not decide the
issue of the general right to treatment. Instead it held that the
involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to receive
treatment if such treatment is necessary to ensure safety and free-
dom from undue restraint.
48
40. 102 S. Ct. at 2459. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (state not required to
fund abortions). See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state not required to provide
medical treatment).
41. 102 S. Ct. at 2459. See Richard v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (state does have
duty to provide certain services to institutionalized persons). See also Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state can regulate monthly limit on welfare payments).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 2459.
43. Id.
44. Id. Romeo asserted that further self-help programs were needed to reduce his ag-
gressive behavior. See Reply Brief for Respondent at 21-22, 50. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S.
Ct. 2452 (1982). The Youngberg Court noted that Romeo repeatedly indicated that if his
experts were permitted to testify, they would illustrate that additional training programs
were needed to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
App. at 98-104. Therefore, the Court concluded that Romeo only sought treatment related
to his interest in safety and freedom from restraint. 102 S. Ct. at 2459.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 2459.
46. Id. at 2459-60.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2460.
Vol. 21:10371042
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Having established that Romeo had certain liberty rights under
the fourteenth amendment, the Court articulated the proper stan-
dards to be used in determining whether his rights had indeed
been violated.4 9 The Court stated that in ascertaining whether a
substantive right has been violated, it becomes necessary to bal-
ance the liberty interest of the individual with the demands of so-
ciety.50 The majority suggested that the Court in previous cases
had weighed the individual's interest against the State's proposed
interests in restraining him;5 therefore, the Court concluded that
Romeo's liberty interests must be balanced against the pertinent
state interests. 2
The Youngberg Court noted that they had taken a similar ap-
proach when deciding procedural due process challenges to civil
commitment proceedings.53 In Parham v. J.R.,5' the Court, in de-
termining that procedural due process did not require an adver-
sarial hearing when a challenge to state procedures for committing
a minor was raised, weighed the individual's liberty interest
against the state's interests, including fiscal and administrative
burdens.55 The Youngberg Court concluded that if there is to be
uniformity in protecting liberty interests, this balancing must not
be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or jury."' Therefore,
the Court next considered the proper standard to be applied in
determining whether a state has adequately protected the rights of
the involuntarily committed.57
The Supreme Court adopted the standard proposed by Chief
Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion below as being reflective of
the proper balance between the legitimate state interests and the
involuntarily committed person's right to safety and freedom from
49. Id. The Court noted that in operating an institution such as Pennhurst, it may
become necessary on certain occasions to restrain the residents. The majority concluded
that the issue was not whether a liberty interest had been infringed upon, but whether the
extent of the restraint was such to violate substantive due process. Id.
50. Id. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(Harlan suggested individual liberty must be balanced against societal interests).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 2460-61. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (court weighed
pretrial detainees' liberty interests against state's reasons for detaining and upheld the re-
strictions that were reasonably related to legitimate government interest). See also Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (court weighed liberty interests against legitimate state interest
in determining whether procedural due process required an adversarial hearing).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 2461.
53. Id.
54. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).





unreasonable restraint.58 Chief Judge Seitz asserted that the
proper standard for determining whether Romeo's rights had been
violated was first to decide if professional judgment was em-
ployed;5 9 if professional judgment was in fact exercised, Romeo's
rights were not violated.' 0 The majority further suggested that this
standard was a lower one than either the "compelling" or "sub-
stantial" necessity tests proposed by the court of appeals. 1
The Supreme Court further proposed that Romeo was entitled
to minimally adequate treatment if such treatment was reasonable
in light of his interests in freedom of movement and personal
safety. 2 The Court also noted that judicial review should be lim-
ited only to the issue of whether professional judgment was in fact
exercised;' 8 concluding that where a professional's judgment is
questioned, there is a presumption of validity.64 Furthermore, if a
professional were sued individually for the exercise of his judg-
ment, he would not be held personally liable if he was unable to
uphold average professional standards due to budgetary
considerations.5
The Supreme Court thus held that mental patients who have
been involuntarily committed retain certain liberty interests and
these interests must subsequently be weighed against relevant
state interests to determine if their interests were indeed vio-
lated."1 The Court emphasized that the state does have a duty to
provide adequate food, shelter, medical care, and clothing.67 Fur-
thermore, the Court asserted that the state may not restrain an
individual except to the extent that professional judgment was ex-
58. Id.
59. Id. Chief Judge Seitz stated that it was not the role of the court to articulate
which professional choice should have been made, but rather only to make sure that profes-
sional judgment was indeed exercised. The court defined a professional as a person who is
competent, whether by education, training, or experience, to make the decision at issue. See
644 F.2d at 178 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
60. 102 S. Ct. at 2461.
61. Id. The Court noted that the standard proposed by the court of appeals would
place a harsh burden on the administration of institutions. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2461-62. Justice Powell noted that there exists no reason to believe that
judges and juries are more qualified than professionals in the decision-making process. Id.
64. Id. at 2462.
65. Id. The Youngberg Court noted that good faith immunity would bar the official
from personal liability. Liability may only be imposed when the decision rendered is a sub-
stantial departure from accepted practices. Id.
66. Id. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67. 102 S. Ct. at 2462.
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ercised and it was determined that such restraint was necessary.68
Finally, the majority noted that it may be unreasonable not to pro-
vide training when such training could substantially reduce the
need for physical restraint and the probability of violence."'
The Youngberg Court concluded that Romeo enjoyed constitu-
tionally protected interests in personal safety, freedom of move-
ment, and minimally adequate training after commitment to
Pennhurst.70 The Court held that when determining whether a
state had fulfilled its obligation to the involuntarily committed, the
courts are to look at the decisions of the appropriate professional,
71
noting that the professional's judgment would be afforded a pre-
sumption of validity." Justice Powell noted that such a presump-
tion was necessary to enable state institutions to continue to func-
tion.7 3 The Court recognized that a single professional might be
required to make numerous decisions with respect to varying
problems in one day.7' Therefore, the administrators and profes-
sional personnel should not be continually threatened with a dam-
age action when making each decision.
75
The Court concluded that the jury was erroneously instructed on
the proper standard of liability, i.e., the eighth amendment.7 6 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of
appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.7
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring-opinion in which he raised
two distinct issues.78 The first concerned whether the state could
constitutionally refuse to provide treatment to a mental patient af-
ter accepting him for "care and treatment. '79 Justice Blackmun re-
lied upon Jackson v. Indiana8" for the constitutional standard for
evaluating the confinement of one civilly committed. 81 The Su-
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2462-63.








78. Id. at 2463 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined in
the concurrence.
79. Id. Justice Blackmun proposed that if that issue were properly raised before the
Court, a question would arise as to whether as a matter of due process, the state could
refuse to provide treatment. Id.




preme Court in Jackson held that "due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed. 8 2 Justice
Blackmun noted that under this standard, a state could accept a
patient for safekeeping and still constitutionally refuse to provide
treatment since commitment without treatment would bear a rea-
sonable relation to the purpose of the confinement. 83 However, if a
state court orders a mental patient to be confined for "care and
treatment," due process might bind the state to ensure such com-
mitment bears a reasonable relation to these goals. 4
Justice Blackmun noted that in respondent's case, the majority
and principal concurring opinions of the court of appeals agreed
that by basing Romeo's deprivation of liberty partially upon the
promise of treatment, the state committed the community's re-
sources to provide at least minimal treatment.8 5 The concurrence
noted, however, that neither opinion clarified whether the term
treatment was to be defined under Pennsylvania law. 6 To the ex-
tent the majority addressed the issue presented in the evidence on
the record, although the evidence was somewhat inconsistent, it
found that it suggested not a total failure of treatment so much as
an inadequacy of treatment.8 7 Therefore, on the Court's reading of
the record, the Supreme Court held that respondent's right to
"treatment" under Pennsylvania law was not properly raised and,
given this uncertainty, Justice Blackmun was in accordance with
the Court's decision not to address the constitutionality of the
state's failure to provide "treatment" to a mental patient who has
been involuntarily committed. 88
The second question, according to Justice Blackmun, concerned
the broad issue of whether Romeo had a separate constitutional
right under the fourteenth amendment to treatment to preserve
those basic self-care skills which he possessed prior to commit-
ment.89 Justice Blackmun noted that the majority even held that
after a person is committed to a state mental hospital, he is enti-
tled to such training as would be required to prevent unreasonable
82. Id. at 738.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2463 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2463-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2464 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Justice Blackmun noted such basic self-care skills as the ability to dress oneself
and to care for personal hygiene.
1046 Vol. 21:1037
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losses of additional liberty, i.e., unsafe conditions or unreasonable
restraint.90 Blackmun also suggested that if a patient could demon-
strate that he entered the institution with certain basic self-care
skills, but lost those skills because of the state's refusal to provide
training, then such a patient has been deprived of a liberty interest
as serious as the loss of safety or freedom from restraint.91
Justice Blackmun asserted that although Romeo asserted a claim
of this type, on the basis of the record, it was unclear whether any
habilitation unrelated to safety and freedom of movement was
sought.9" Justice Blackmun concluded that if respondent was actu-
ally seeking habilitation to reduce aggressive tendencies and to
maintain basic self-care skills, he would be free on remand to as-
sert the claim. 9" Also following the majority, Justice Blackmun
would defer to the judgment of professionals as to the extent train-
ing would preserve any preexisting skills.9'
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun concluded that if expert
testimony revealed that respondent was so retarded when he en-
tered the institution that he had no self-care skills to preserve,
then there would be no additional loss of liberty if training was not
provided. 95 However, if testimony established that respondent did
possess certain basic skills upon entering the institution, then Jus-
tice Blackmun noted that he would be amenable to a constitutional
argument even when safety and mobility were not restricted.9" On
the basis of a less-than-fully developed record, the Court found it
premature to resolve the constitutional question and Justice Black-
mun agreed with the Court's conclusion and thus concurred with
the opinion.'7
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated
that he would hold that Romeo had no general right to treatment
under the Constitution, 8 noting that Romeo could never live
outside Pennhurst due to the severity of his retardation and that
he did not seek to be discharged from the institution. 99 Therefore,













duty to provide shelter, medical treatment, food, and living condi-
tions as safe as might reasonably be expected.100 However, Chief
Justice Burger noted that the state did not seek custody of respon-
dent but that respondent's family sought state aid.101
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Court that some amount of
self-care instruction may be necessary to avoid unreasonable in-
fringment of the patient's interests in safety and freedom from re-
straint.1 0 2 However, he noted that the Constitution did not other-
wise place an affirmative duty upon the state to provide any type
of treatment. 03 Since respondent sought a right to minimally ade-
quate treatment, the constitutional issue should not be avoided.'"
Chief Justice Burger also pointed out that it is largely irrelevant
whether respondent's experts were of the opinion that other train-
ing programs were needed to reduce Romeo's aggressive tendencies
because the training program implemented by petitioners was pre-
sumptively valid.10 5 Furthermore, liability could be imposed only
when the decision was a substantial departure from accepted stan-
dards. 10 6 Therefore, even if respondent could demonstrate that the
treatment programs at Pennhurst were not consistent with gener-
ally accepted practices, as long as professional judgment was in
fact exercised, respondent's claim would not prevail.10 7
Finally, Chief Justice Burger noted that the district court erred
in its jury instruction by utilizing the eighth amendment and sug-
gesting that the officials would only be liable if they failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent attacks on Romeo.108
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court was presented with the right
of the involuntarily committed person to freedom of movement, 09





104. Id. at 2465-66 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2466 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Chief Justice Burger noted that the district court's instructions which stated
that petitioners would be liable if they "failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent re-
peated attacks upon" Romeo, were overly generous to respondent. Chief Justice Burger con-
cluded by commenting that if the officials had taken all reasonable steps possible to prevent
the attacks on Romeo, they could not have been said to have deprived respondent of either
his right to safety or of the training necessary to achieve reasonable safety. Id.
109. Id. at 2458.
110. Id. at 2457.
111. Id. at 2458.
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sonal safety and freedom of movement, were held to be rights de-
rived from historically protected liberty interests."" The third
question, the right to treatment, was the central issue of the
Youngberg decision and the focal point of the majority's
decision."'
The right to treatment for the involuntarily committed repre-
sents a recent development in American constitutional law, which
has its roots in the eighth and fourteenth amendments. " The
right to treatment under the eighth amendment began to develop
with the 1962 Supreme Court decision of Robinson v. California.'1
The Robinson approach to the eighth amendment right to treat-
ment first provided that any punishment of a status is inherently
cruel and unusual, and secondly, that being mentally ill and dan-
gerous is a status under the Robinson rule.116 Therefore, since civil
commitment not associated with treatment constitutes punishment
and is applied because of the status of being mentally ill, it is cruel
and unusual and in violation of the eighth amendment.1
After the Robinson decision, some of the courts of appeals began
to recognize an eighth amendment right to treatment, beginning
with Rouse v. Cameron.1 8 In Rouse, the court of appeals held that
indefinite confinement of one who has not been found criminally
responsible may be so inhumane as to be considered cruel and un-
usual punishment.119 In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held in Bowring v. Godwin,12 0 that there was no distinction
between the right to medical care for physical illness and its psy-
chological counterpart. 12  Although the courts of appeals. have
shown a favorable attitude towards recognizing the right to treat-
ment under the eighth amendment,1 2 2 most authorities confine the
112. Id. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113. 102 S. Ct. at 2458.
114. See Comment, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth
Amendment Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. R v. 731 (1978). See also Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (failure of state to provide treatment raised a significant due process
question).
115. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment forbids a state to punish a person for the
mere status of being mentally ill).
116. See Spece, Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Con-
structive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARiz. L. Rav. 1,
19 (1978).
117. Id.
118. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
119. Id. at 453.
120. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
121. Id. at 47.
122. See supra notes 118-120 & accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note
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application of the eighth amendment to the regulation of criminal
punishment. " ' But in Ingraham v. Wright,1 24 the Supreme Court
left open the possibility of applying the eighth amendment to non-
criminal contexts.
12 5
However, the Youngberg court chose not to address the eighth
amendment basis for the involuntarily committed person's right to
treatment.126 Although Romeo raised such an issue in his com-
plaint, the eighth amendment approach was rejected by the court
of appeals1 2 7 and subsequently not considered by the Supreme
Court.
1 28
The second basis for a constitutional right to treatment for the
involuntarily committed lies in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. This notion was initially promulgated by
Judge Bazelon in Rouse v. Cameron,129 where he proposed that
failure to supply treatment to an involuntarily confined mental pa-
tient raised a significant due process question.3 0 Subsequent to
Rouse, there developed a growing movement to establish a consti-
tutional right to treatment under the fourteenth amendment, be-
ginning with the 1971 decision of Wyatt v. Stickney," in which
the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that
when patients are committed for treatment purposes, they unques-
tionably have the right to receive individual treatment that will
cure or improve their condition.1 3 2 Subsequently, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's decision.' 3
Although a distinction could be made in that the Wyatt case
dealt with mental patients who were committed for the purpose of
treatment, the court of appeals faced a general right to treatment
114, at 731.
123. Comment, supra note 114, at 737.
124. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
125. Id. at 669 n.37.
126. 102 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
127. Id. at 2456.
128. Id. at 2457. The Court articulated the issue in Romeo as the substantive rights of
the involuntarily committed under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
129. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
130. Id. at 453. In Rouse, petitioner had been confined after being found not guilty by
reason of insanity. Petitioner argued that his confinement should be conditioned upon the
state's provision of treatment; Judge Bazelon proposed that failure of the state to provide
treatment raised a significant due process question. Id.
131. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), alf'd, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
132. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
133. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g, Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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issue in Donaldson v. O'Connor."" In Donaldson, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit developed two rationales for a due pro-
cess right to treatment," the first of which was based upon the
premise that any governmental abridgement of freedom must be
justified by some permissible governmental goal." e Thus, when a
state commits a person for the purpose of caring for him, treat-
ment must be provided, because without treatment, the nature of
commitment bears no reasonable relation to its purpose, and due
process is therefore violated.13 7 The second rationale is based upon
a "quid pro quo" theory which proposes that a state cannot confine
a person unless it can justify such confinement by providing a quid
pro quo in the form of rehabilitation treatment.'" A fourteenth
amendment right to treatment had finally been established under
Donaldson, but it was soon curtailed when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari " 9 to hear the Donaldson case.14 0 The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the court of appeals' decision noting
that the appellate court should only consider on remand the issue
of monetary liability and not the issue of right to treatment.1
4 '
Thus, the Court avoided the broad issue of a constitutional right to
treatment."2 Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger wrote in his con-
curring opinion that the Fifth Circuit's analysis regarding a right
to treatment had no basis in the decision of the Supreme Court."
3
The Supreme Court's stance in Donaldson briefly deterred the
courts of appeals from finding a fourteenth amendment right to
treatment. "'
In 1977, however, the eighth circuit once again attempted to es-
tablish a constitutional right to treatment by holding in Welsch v.
134. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In the
Donaldson case, a former mental patient who had been involuntarily committed to a state
hospital brought an action against state physicians and officials who allegedly deprived him
of his constitutional rights to receive treatment or be released from the 'hospital. The court
of appeals held that the patient had a constitutional right to treatment if such treatment
would improve his condition. 493 F.2d at 527.
135. Id. at 520-25.
136. Id. at 520.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 522.
139. 419 U.S. 894 (1974).
140. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
141. Id. at 577 n.12.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 587-88 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
144. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (court declined to find a due
process right to treatment).
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Likins" I5 that the noncriminal mentally retarded patient who has
been committed to a state institution has the constitutional right
to at least minimally adequate treatment.1' Two years later, a dis-
trict court went even further by adding that the fact that a patient
is deemed dangerous does not deprive him of a constitutional right
to treatment.
47
The constitutional right to treatment has been recognized in the
past by many commentators and courts.4 8 However, although the
right has been recognized, there appears to be a great deal of con-
fusion surrounding the proper basis upon which the right should
be grounded.
1 49
Professor Spece, in his thesis on the right to treatment, has com-
mented that there are six separate theories used to establish a
right to treatment: three quid pro quo theories,1 50 an eighth
amendment/Robinson v. California theory, 5' a protection from
harm theory,15 2 and a least restrictive alternative theory.153 He pro-
poses that although the right to treatment has been supported by
the lower federal courts, there has yet to be articulated a sound
conceptual basis for the right.
154
Of the six theories established by Professor Spece, his least re-
strictive alternative theory is the only one which he found to be
consistent with logic, precedent, and constitutional standards of ju-
dicial review.1 55 The theory proceeds from a recognition that under
the fourteenth amendment concepts of equal protection and due
process, deprivations of constitutional rights must be justified by
considerations which require intrusions as opposed to other forms
145. 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
146. Id. at 1125, 1129.
147. See Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979). In Eckerhart, the
district court held that due process requires that patients who have been involuntarily com-
mitted to state mental hospitals be provided with such treatment as will give them reasona-
ble opportunity for cure or improvement. But the fourteenth amendment does not require
the state to provide such treatment to certain untreatable patients. However, the fact that a
patient is perceived as dangerous does not deprive him of this constitutional right to treat-
ment. Id.
148. See Spece, supra note 116, at 2. See also Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46
A.B.A. J. 499 (1960). See generally supra notes 114-47 and accompanying text.
149. See Spece, supra note 116, at 2.
150. Id. at 4-15.
151. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Spece, supra note 116, at 16-28. See also notes 115-17
and accompanying text for discussion of Robinson decision.
152. See Spece, supra note 116, at 28-33.
153. Id. at 33-46.
154. Id. at 47.
155. Id. at 33.
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of independent compensation. " It is based on the notion that
commitment impinges on the important right to freedom from con-
finement and this deprivation must be justified by some overriding
state interests which can be obtained only through commitment.'57
In summary, the thesis proposes a less restrictive alternative stan-
dard of review which utilizes the compelling state interest test to
discern, on an individual basis, whether a patient is entitled to
treatment in a state mental hospital.' 58 The theory suggests the
notion that it is applicable irrespective of the purpose of
commitment. 159
Once again in Youngberg v. Romeo,' 06 the Supreme Court was
afforded the opportunity to discuss a general constitutional right
to treatment.''6 The Court declined to address the broad constitu-
tional issue, observing that Romeo sought only treatment related
to his interests in personal safety and freedom of movement. 162 Be-
cause of the importance of a constitutional right to treatment to
the involuntarily committed mental patient,"6 3 and because of the
lower federal courts' favorable policy towards such a right, 64 the
Court should have addressed this question.
After Youngberg it is unclear how the Supreme Court will re-
spond when squarely faced with a general constitutional right to
treatment issue, although the Chief Justice made it evident in his
concurrence that he feels there should be no such right and that
the majority should have held so in the instant case.' 6" However, as
Professor Spece stated, the plight of the involuntarily committed
deserves the careful attention of legal scholars, for treatment is
their sole prospect for cure or improvement.
166
Kimberly J. Gallagher
156. Id. at 42 n.139.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 38.
159. Id. at 42.
160. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2459.
163. See Birnbaum, supra note 148, at 499.
164. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
165. 102 S. Ct. at 2465 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
166. See Spece, supra note 116, at 1.
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